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Abstract
This study examines the possible opposing effects of the board function of busyness (i.e. 
the presence of busy independent non-executive directors serving on multiple boards) on 
bank dividend payout patterns between two alternative payouts models (i.e. conventional 
and Islamic). Using an international sample for listed banks during the periods of 2006–
2018, we show that the busyness of boards of directors can explain differential dividend 
payouts behaviour between two banking systems. For conventional banking dividend 
model, a busy board has a significantly positive impact on the bank’s dividend payout level. 
However, during the financial crisis of 2007/2009, the positive impact of board busyness on 
dividends payouts is tempered for these banks. In contrast, Islamic banks operating under 
a more constrained dividend model, report significantly lower levels of payouts and lower 
likelihood when they have busy directors on board. We find insignificant evidence for the 
effect of the financial crisis in Islamic banks. These results highlight a potential challenge 
for the unique agency conflicts arising from the complex payout model of Islamic banks (in 
terms of profit distribution principles, motives, mechanics and techniques, and flexibility 
of payouts), which is subject to the demand for greater monitoring and additional rulings 
when compared to the conventional.
Keywords Busy boards · Dividends policy · Bank type · Payouts model
JEL Classification C23 · G01 · G21 · G28 · L50 · M4
1 Introduction
The 2007–2009 global financial crisis appears to have brought a more controlled opera-
tional environment to banking and increased complexity in governance with additional 
calls for effective monitoring by the board of directors. This was followed by increased 
public calls and support from policymakers in designing effective board governance in 
banks to create a more ethical and sustainable value and to align the interests of managers 
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with those of shareholders and other stakeholders (Trinh et al. 2020a). Although dividend 
payouts strategies have been investigated over 50 years, since Modigliani and Miller’s sem-
inal work (1958, 1961), it remains a ‘puzzle’ from an agency perspective. Dividend payout 
is an implicit governance tool in reducing agency costs between shareholders and manag-
ers (Sharma 2011; Onali et al. 2016; Mulyani et al. 2016). This is because the monitoring 
needs of capital providers are lower since the amount of free cash flow is reduced after 
distributing dividends, leading to a lower probability of managers wasting excess available 
cash (e.g. DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2000; Harford et al. 2008). In line with the risk aver-
sion perspective, managers are likely to have a lower risk tolerance than firm shareholders 
since they might have substantial personal gains/incentives tied up with the firm’s perfor-
mance. As identified by Easterbrook (1984), shareholders might have the preference for 
higher dividends payouts, which reduce retained earnings, and forces managers to raise 
external funds.
Managers commonly use dividend payment to lessen agency costs (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo 2000) but a primary concern is related to the fact that those managers have a 
control and can exercise discretion over the dividend strategies and payout levels. Because 
dividends reduce the proportion of discretionary funds available, those managers might 
have opportunities/incentives to manipulate the payout ratios to guarantee that excess 
profits will be retained within the company to meet self-objectives, ceteris paribus (East-
erbrook 1984). Therefore, a board of directors (BOD) provides an essential internal gov-
ernance mechanism to prevent such managerial discretion. This board has an ultimate over-
sight responsibility to scrutinise payouts policies, including the levels of payments before 
announcing dividends to the capital markets (White 1996). Such responsibility involves 
considerations of various factors related to a firm’s growth opportunities, current leverage, 
and potential emergencies before approving a payout. Therefore, the BOD has an essential 
role in influencing and controlling agency costs associated with payouts process of divi-
dends (Sharma 2011).
Appointing a busy BOD (i.e., independent directors holding multiple board seats across 
many firms) can jeopardise the board’s effective control over payout policies. In line with 
the resource dependence theory, effective monitoring by BOD is vital for efficient resource 
allocation and risk mitigation (Meng et al. 2018; DeBoskey et al. 2019; Trinh et al. 2020a). 
However, an intense monitoring by boards is argued to be costly and complex for some 
institutions particularly in financial institutions (John et al. 2015), and a busy board might 
be challenged to fulfil their supervisory/advisory roles due to the limited time/efforts avail-
able from working across several banks’ boards (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Trinh et  al. 
2020b). Under the expectations of weak oversight by busy board, conflict of interests 
between shareholders and managers are likely to emerge. Board busyness is likely to lead 
to high agency costs, related to free cash flow and optimal choices of financial policies. 
Such associated conflicts have adverse impacts on dividend payout levels, investors’ per-
ceptions and stock market valuations (Sharma 2011; Chou and Feng 2019; Elnahass et al. 
2020a). However, employing a busy BOD might still bring some reputational benefits to 
firms such as promoting extended business networking as well as connections, and quick 
access to market resources (Trinh et al. 2020b). As such, banks employing busy outside 
directors might positively influence their dividends policy through flexible access to capital 
markets to raise funds at lower costs. Also, multiple directorships are likely to enhance 
internal board monitoring and reduce the agency problems of a firm’s liquid assets. They 
may also result in using the cash more effectively and providing direct benefits to share-
holders and dividend policy.
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Under these two opposing views for board busyness, there is a relatively limited evi-
dence on the impact of effective systems of governance and the influence of busy boards 
on the dividend policy within the banking sector. Dividend payouts strategy in the banking 
industry makes up a crucial pillar for their rigorous and prudent risk management (Kanas 
2013); which became subject to stricter scrutiny by policy makers (Lepetit et  al. 2018). 
In conventional banking, prior studies provide mixed evidence and they mainly focus on 
industrial firms (i.e. Sharma 2011; Akhigbe and Whyte 2012; Onali et  al. 2016; Kutubi 
et  al. 2018; Chou and Feng 2019).1 Alongside this inconsistent finding, there is a clear 
gap in the literature to study alternative dividends payout models by different bank types 
(i.e. Islamic and conventional banks). While comparative assessments across the two bank 
types have been evolving over the past few years (e.g., Mollah and Zaman 2015; Mollah 
et  al. 2017; Elnahass et  al. 2020a; Trinh et  al. 2020a, b), however, none of these stud-
ies have explicitly examined the association between board busyness and dividend pay-
outs under the different banking business models like the Islamic and conventional models. 
Thus, investigating the influence of busy boards across Islamic and conventional banks will 
contribute to the ongoing debate identifying the impacts of different institutional character-
istics and the importance of an effective governance system within the domain of dividend 
strategies in financial institutions.
Islamic banks operate on a non-interested based model which is governed by Shariah 
rulings with the aim to promote profit-loss sharing between the bank and depositors and 
to reduce uncertainty and speculations in trading/allocation of fund resources which are 
prohibited in Islam. The governance structures adopted by Islamic banking are more com-
plicated compared to their conventional counterparts (Mollah and Zaman 2015). In both 
bank types, the BOD is responsible for the execution of strategic decisions, protection of 
the shareholders’ interest and maximisation of the bank value. Based on some theoretical 
arguments by prior studies, there are some differences between the dividend policies of 
Islamic and conventional banks (e.g. Athari et al. 2016; Safiullah and Shamsuddin 2019). 
These differences are mainly related to dividend distribution principles, motives, mechan-
ics and techniques, and flexibility of payouts. In general terms, the distributions of prof-
its in Islamic banks must be compliant with Shari’ah principles (Duqi et  al. 2020) and 
hence, their payouts involve a nexus of contracts between the bank, depositors and share-
holders (Alhabshi 2002). The distributions of profits and the payouts policy within Islamic 
banks are more complex and less flexible than that of conventional banks. Islamic banks 
are usually challenged by liquidity management issues and accessing short-term borrow-
ings from external sources (Čihák and Hesse 2010; Beck et al. 2013). Subsequently, they 
hold substantial excess free cash flow or other liquid assets at a low rate of return to meet 
expected/unexpected capital challenges and regulatory capital requirements (Elnahass et al. 
2018). These constraints can have implications on the dividend payout strategies in Islamic 
banks, leading to low payouts ratios and less stable dividends distributions in the long-term 
(Athari et al. 2016). In contrast, conventional banks have quicker access to market sources 
and can use alternative financial instruments such as derivatives and options, which are 
prohibited in Islamic banking. These liquidity instruments are likely to promote greater 
flexibility to support dividend payouts strategies (Bitar et al. 2017).
1 For example, while Sharma (2011) find that board busyness increases agency problems associated with a 
likelihood to pay dividends, Chou and Feng (2019) suggest that board multiple directorships lead to higher 
dividend payouts of cash when companies have limited investment opportunities.
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Given the constraints imposed on the Islamic banking business model, the extended 
agency costs associated with this banking model and under its complex governance struc-
ture (see Abdelsalam et  al. 2016), employing busy outside directors can have adverse 
implications on board of directors’ monitoring abilities over dividend payouts. For exam-
ple, board busyness might encourage managers to ex-post deviate from the payout policy 
and engage in poor or risky investment decisions. The negative impact of board busy-
ness is likely to be more pronounced in Islamic banks than conventional banks (Elnahass 
et  al. 2020a; Trinh et  al. 2020a). Weak monitoring by the busy board can thus result in 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems on both sides of the balance sheet of Islamic 
banks (Visser 2009). Contrary, conventional banks operating on a less constrained busi-
ness and dividend model and single-layer governance structure would have lower agency 
costs. Therefore, conventional banks can obtain the reputational benefits from busy boards 
through their improved internal monitoring ability. Accordingly, our premise in this study 
is that having a busy board in Islamic banks is likely to be associated with a lower payout 
ratio than that in conventional banks.
We use a comprehensive sample of 742 bank-year observations (70 listed banks) in 11 
countries from the periods of 2006–2018. We focus on fully-ledged Islamic and conven-
tional banks while dropping banks with Islamic windows.2 Our final sample focuses on 
countries classified as emerging capital markets, which have long been ignored in empiri-
cal examinations by prior research. This set of countries operates on a dual banking sys-
tem and report remarkable discrepancies in their dividend payouts policy, both in nature 
and characteristics of payments, relative to developed countries (Jabbouri 2016). Previous 
studies (e.g. Aldoseri and Worthington 2016) also document that these emerging capital 
markets have lower information asymmetry, more volatile, and smaller size than developed 
markets. Our focus on these set of countries also responds to calls by prior literature to 
investigate dividends policies in line with the several particularities reflected by emerg-
ing countries (e.g. Lagoarde-Segot 2013; Jabbouri 2016). Islamic banks in these countries 
are highly concentrated and well-established (Aldoseri and Worthington 2016). Hence, this 
study offers an ideal setting for comparative assessments among different banking systems.
Findings show that for the full sample (i.e. conventional and Islamic banks together), 
banks with busy boards exhibit, on average, higher payout ratio. This finding is consistent 
with the reputation hypothesis, suggesting that busy directors can use their expertise and 
connections to support effective dividends policy. Analyses conditioned on the bank type 
support our expectation and show that a conventional bank with a busy board offers signifi-
cantly higher cash dividends and are more likely to pay dividends relative to Islamic banks. 
Having busy boards in Islamic banks leads to a detrimental effect on the dividend payout 
levels and likelihood. These results suggest that dividend strategies of Islamic banks are 
significantly influenced by board busyness, unlike their conventional counterparts. These 
results are consistent with expectations and attributable to the constrained dividend model 
used in Islamic banking. Our extended analyses show that conventional banks with busy 
boards have a higher likelihood to pay a dividend than Islamic banks. We also examined 
the effect of the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and find that during the crisis period, the 
impact of board busyness on dividends payouts is significantly lower within conventional 
2 Islamic windows represent conventional banks with an independent department providing Islamic ser-
vices with a Shari’ah board. These windows are excluded from the sampled banks of this study because the 
supervisory issues and accountancy requirements of those banks are different from the full-ledged Islamic 
banks (Elnahass et al. 2018; Trinh et al. 2020b).
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but we observed insignificant effect within Islamic banks. Moreover, we find a non-lin-
ear linkage between busy boards and dividend level within conventional banks. That is, 
the reputation effects diminish proportionally as the outside board directorships increase. 
However, we merely find a simple linear relation between board busyness and Islamic bank 
dividends policy.
This study contributes to prior literature in several ways. To the best of our knowledge, 
this study is the first to examine the impact of board busyness and dividend policies in the 
banking industry and within a broader international context representing emerging capital 
markets. Hence, we offer updated evidence to prior studies in dividends policies for emerg-
ing countries (e.g. Baker et  al. 2011; Jabbouri 2016). Our results also contribute to the 
inconclusive evidence within the U.S context, which only examined non-financial indus-
tries (e.g., Sharma 2011; Chou and Feng 2019). This study is also the first to investigate 
the possible differential impacts on payout policies across different bank types by utilising 
an important board attribute such as busyness and exploiting a unique dividend model of 
Islamic banking. Such comparative assessments between the alternative dividend models 
employed by Islamic versus conventional banks is necessary to extend both prior theoreti-
cal studies within the Islamic banking context (e.g., Al-Gurrah Daghi 2009; Essa 2010) 
and conventional banking studies (e.g. Sharma 2011; Jiraporn et al. 2011; Chou and Feng 
2019). Moreover, we contribute to the growing stream of Islamic-conventional banking lit-
erature (e.g., Abdelsalam et al. 2016; Mollah et al. 2017; Alandejani et al. 2017; Alqahtani 
et al. 2017; Safiullah and Shamsuddin 2019; Duqi et al. 2020). Finally, our study adds to 
the ongoing debate about the effect of institutional characteristics and stricter governance 
mechanisms on several firm outcomes such as firm performance, risk-taking, capital struc-
ture, and cost of debt and cash holdings (e.g., Brown and Caylor 2006; Harford et al. 2008; 
Cheng et al. 2008; Meng et al. 2018).
The findings in this study provide important implications to bank regulators, inves-
tors and stock markets which engage with both bank types. Among the two bank types, 
we observe that dividend strategies are substantially affected by this attribute of the BOD 
(i.e., board busyness). For conventional banks, regulators and market participants can ben-
efit from the empirical evidence presented in this study, which highlights that BOD busy-
ness promotes several reputational benefits, which are likely to enhance dividend payout 
strategies for banks. This offers important implications for wealth creation and the proper 
investment decisions of investors. Nonetheless, such reputational benefits associated with 
recruiting busy boards might not be invoked in the presence of unique systems of govern-
ance and constrained banking model, as presented by Islamic banks. Accordingly, the find-
ings are likely to inform the investment decisions of market participants who engage with 
the two bank types and for policy makers who govern countries with dual banking systems. 
Furthermore, as the international capital markets and regulatory standards are continuously 
revisited to promote high financial reporting quality systems and effective mechanisms of 
governance, our results might assist regulators in explaining the differential payouts pat-
terns, which are conditional on the bank type. Moreover, we offer new venues into the 
examinations of dividend policy in emerging economies, which can support current regula-
tory reforms for multiple directorships and board diversity (Lagoarde-Segot 2013; Jabbouri 
2016). Finally, Islamic banks can learn from their conventional counterparts on how to pro-
mote reputational benefits associated with payouts policies, including effective mitigation 
of extended agency issues when recruiting busy boards.
The next section presents the background and theoretical framework. Section  3 out-
lines the study hypotheses. Section 4 presents data and sample. Section 5 reports methods 
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and measures. Section 6 discusses the findings and additional sensitivities. Finally, Sect. 7 
closes the study.
2  Background
2.1  Theoretical framework
The agency theory represents one of the dominant views on dividend policies (see Nohel 
and Tarhan 1998; Renneboog and Szilagyi 2015). Prior studies have long argued that man-
agers (e.g. CEOs) have their strong incentives to engage in discretionary acts (William-
son 1964), take excessive compensation and perquisites (Sharma 2011), and utilise excess 
free cash flow in unprofitable projects. Easterbrook (1984) highlights that the monitoring 
and risk-aversion preferences might lead to agency problems between managers and share-
holders and hence result in the arisen of cash dividends. Managers are likely to manipu-
late and shift the amounts of dividends across future periods (i.e. the earnings smoothing 
effect) if they have motives to increase the dividend ratios despite the low level of per-
manent earnings. A managerial discretion to establish the payout policy can exacerbate 
the agency problems between managers and shareholders; such conflict is notably more 
severe in banks because of their highly levered capital structure (John et al. 2010). Moreo-
ver, according to Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993) and Collins et al., (1994), dividends are 
usually employed as a signalling mechanism by banks. For example, banks can convey use-
ful information to investors about the bank growth opportunities through dividend payouts 
(Abreu and Gulamhussen 2013).
The context of intense regulation and higher asymmetry in the banking sector lead to the 
unique relevance/role of the BOD, which has a legal responsibility in approving a bank’s 
policies, procedures and business strategies. This board would have an ultimate oversight 
function for bank decisions (Elyasiani and Zhang 2015; Lu and Boateng 2018). The duties 
and obligations of the bank directors (i.e. inside and outside directors) serving on the board 
may arise in two primary contexts. First, they need to bring a discrete decision to the board 
for approval, which results in a rise of directors’ legal responsibility on bank safety and 
soundness. Second, they must provide an effective bank oversight for the bank operations 
(Elyasiani and Zhang 2015). Also, many stakeholders (e.g. authorities) have placed addi-
tional expectations on bank BODs that delineate their responsibilities even further. Outside 
directors serving on the BODs should have either advisory or oversight role, or both over 
executives. They should also perform their tasks independently from inside directors in 
which they can provide vigilant scrutiny over inside board members on behalf of share-
holders and, thus, may reduce agency problems (Fama and Jensen 1983; Harkin et  al. 
2019). To monitor managers more effectively, those outside directors might be required to 
invest their time, attention and efforts to analyse any information provided by managers, 
banks and consultants (Trinh et al. 2020b).
Prior studies provide mixed evidence for the effect of corporate governance on dividend 
policies. Within the industrial sector, the literature identifies the impact of BOD charac-
teristics on firms’ dividend payout. This includes board size (Van Pelt 2013), independ-
ent directors (Setia-Atmaja 2010; Boumosleh and Cline 2015), CEO duality (Sawicki 
2009), age and experience (Custódio and Metzger 2014), CEO entrenchment (Hu and 
Kumar 2004; Elyasani and Zhang 2015), and board gender diversity (Saeed and Sameer 
2017; Chen et al. 2017). Other studies find a significant and positive impact of corporate 
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governance index (G-Index) on the likelihood of paying dividends and/or dividend yield in 
the US market (e.g., Jiraporn et al. 2011). Hu and Kumar (2004) show that CEO entrench-
ment is likely to increase dividend payout ratios. Setia-Atmaja (2010) also shows a positive 
influence of board independence and dividends paid in family-controlled firms. Renneboog 
and Trojanowski (2011) argue that the voting power of executive directors has a signifi-
cant relation to the propensity to pay dividends or the combination of dividends and share 
repurchases. Deshmukh et al. (2013) find that an over-confident CEO pays lower levels of 
dividends than a rational CEO to accumulate higher financial slack for future investment 
needs. Caliskan and Doukas (2015) document that inside debt induces CEOs to pay divi-
dends while convex CEO compensation is related to the lower payouts.
Board busyness and dividends policies have been previously investigated in non-finan-
cial firms and within the US context. For a sample of US non-financial firms, Sharma 
(2011) shows that the decision to pay out dividends is associated with the strength of board 
governance, which is measured through the level of board busyness. Chou and Feng (2019) 
find that when industrial US firms have more limited investment opportunities, board busy-
ness is positively associated with higher dividend payouts. They explain that multiple 
directorships are likely to enhance internal board monitoring and reduce the agency prob-
lems of a firm’s liquid assets. They also suggest that board busyness results in using the 
cash more effectively and providing direct benefits to shareholders. Other studies identify 
the influences of busy BODs while focuses on firm performance, market value, cost of debt 
and/or risk-taking (e.g. Ferris et  al. 2003; Field et al. 2013; Chakravarty and Rutherford 
2017).
Studies in the banking sector offer limited evidence of the association between govern-
ance and dividends payouts. In conventional banking, Theis and Dutta (2009) examine the 
relationship between inside ownership and dividend payout policies after controlling for 
the levels of bank capitalisation. Akhigbe and Whyte (2012) find a negative effect of mana-
gerial stock ownership and payouts across the financial firms. Onali et  al. (2016) find a 
negative impact of director ownership and CEO power on the dividends of European-listed 
banks. Recently, Duqi et al. (2020) provide evidence on the important role of ownership 
structure (i.e. government, family, foreign) in explaining dividend strategies of Islamic and 
conventional banks, albeit in different patterns. For Islamic banking studies, prior literature 
on payouts of dividends is scarce. For example, Hassan (2003) use the signalling theory 
and show that dividends are only relevant financial information, which helps managers to 
signal returns on investments to the stock market. They emphasise the importance of inves-
tigating an Islamic bank’s dividend model determinants. Al-Gurrah Daghi (2009) and Essa 
(2010) describe from a theoretical context the accounting process used in the profit distri-
bution of Islamic banks and refer to the relevant financial/accounting standards.
Accordingly, evidence on the board busyness and dividends payouts within the banking 
industry in general terms and among different bank types in specific terms, is scant. None 
of the prior studies examined the influence of different bank types as a mediating factor 
for this possible association between board busyness and dividend payout decisions. We, 
hence, seek to fill in these gaps through a comparative assessment of Islamic and conven-
tional banks.
2.2  Alternative dividend models
There are two major features which distinguish the Islamic from conventional business 
model; the dominance of risk sharing between the bank and shareholders alongside the 
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existence of additional monitoring required through a separate board; the Shari’ah super-
visory board (SSB).3 Under the conventional banking finance paradigm, a bank is likely to 
shift credit risk to the depositors under an interest-based contractual arrangement (Safiullah 
and Shamsuddin 2019). Contrarily, in line with the Shari’ah guidelines, Islamic banks are 
expected to perform their intermediation functions through profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) 
contractual agreements between the banks, depositors and investment account holders 
(IAHs) (Alandejani et al. 2017). According to the PLS paradigm, entrepreneurs share their 
profits and losses with Islamic banks according to a pre-determined ratio. Islamic banks 
pool together all profits and losses from different investments and then share the profits 
with depositors of funds taking into account the relative contributions of capital and equity 
and the investment deposits (Olson and Zoubi 2008). A proportion of the remaining earned 
profits is used to pay dividends to equity holders, for which dividends on common equity is 
discretionarily allocated and distributed by the bank managers (Khan and Mirakhor 1989).
Within the Islamic banking context, dividend policies vary across different countries 
because of their variations in the government regulations and tax policies. For example, 
in the six Gulf States, which operate on a dual banking system, there is no dividend tax 
required and Islamic banks must follow the Shari’ah principles related to Zakah payments 
(i.e. charity donations) (Athari et al. 2016). Islamic banks operating in Bahrain and Qatar 
adopt specific Islamic accounting standards developed by the Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).4 In other countries (e.g. Turkey, Malaysia and 
Indonesia), Islamic banks do not strictly follow the Islamic accounting standards, the finan-
cial reporting systems should comply with IFRS besides the central banks’ local standards 
for Islamic banking (Chong and Liu 2009).
There are several structural differences between the Islamic and conventional dividends 
models which can represented in terms of the distribution principles, the extent of flex-
ibility of payouts and the mechanics and techniques (e.g. Ayub 2007; Beck et  al. 2013; 
Athari et al. 2016). We summarise these key differences in Table 1. These differences are 
expected to influence the governance monitoring effectiveness of both bank types and the 
overall levels of dividend payouts.
First, a payout policy in an Islamic bank is likely to be less flexible than that of a con-
ventional bank. While the dividend distribution decisions of the former are significantly 
affected by their challenges in managing liquidity and accessing short-term borrowings 
from outside sources (Beck et al. 2013; Elnahass et al. 2014), the latter has better liquidity 
opportunities promoted by their ease and quick access to external market sources and the 
availability of alternative instruments to raise funds such as hedging and derivatives (Bitar 
et al. 2017; Deng et al. 2017). Islamic banks, therefore, are likely to hold higher capital 
buffers to mitigate their liquidity challenges and preserve their regulatory capital ratios 
(Elnahass et  al. 2018). This is consistent with regulations of Islamic banks with Basel 
III aiming to strengthen global capital and liquidity rules for banks to make them more 
4 The AAOIFI is a standard-setting body for Islamic financial institutions in the areas of accounting, audit-
ing, ethics, and governance. AAOIFI is supported by nearly 200 members from 40 countries, including cen-
tral banks. AAOIFI has issued 88 standards comprising 26 accountability standards, 5 auditing standards, 7 
governance standards, 2 ethics standards, and 48 Shari’ah standards. We find that the main results seem not 
to be changed after controlling for this regulatory variable.
3 The Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB) includes Shari’ah advisors who possess specialist religious knowl-
edge of Islamic institutions. Their primary duties comprise (i) introducing the Shari’ah guidance on the 
business of the bank; (ii) issuing a yearly individual report about the Shari’ah compliance of the Islamic 
bank business; (iii) highlighting any breaches of Islamic law (see Abdelsalam et al. 2016; Farag et al. 2018).
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resilient against shocks. Because the current capitalisation levels in most of Islamic banks 
are high, the requirements of increasing minimum capital may not be difficult to achieve. 
The stricter new capital requirements are also likely to impose a discipline on the better 
utilisation and maintenance of capital in those Islamic banks. In addition, new liquidity 
requirements under Basel III might create some difficulties and serious challenges for 
Islamic banks. That is, they need to meet the minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) but 
it is difficult to find the high-quality liquid Shari’ah –compliant instruments because of the 
lack of supplying in High Quality Liquid Assets, non-existence of secondary capital mar-
kets, and Interbank and money markets (Ozkan and Iqbal 2015). The existence of limited 
sources of finance, such as issuing Islamic bonds, to enhance the liquidity and capital posi-
tion leads to substantial restrictions imposed on the bank business model and dividends 
strategies (Elnahass et al. 2014). As a result, conventional banks are better positioned to 
offer more frequent payouts of dividends at higher rates when compared to Islamic banking 
(Athari et al. 2016).
Second, Islamic banks encounter additional challenges related to their actual (Shari’ah) 
profit determination compared to conventional banks. Under the constrained dividends 
model, any fraction of earnings which are generated from investments that do not comply 
with the Islamic principles cannot be distributed to shareholders or used to acquire assets 
(Safiullah and Shamsuddin 2019).5 Given that an Islamic bank’s contracts should, in prin-
ciple, be backed by underlying assets or investment activity, in many occasions it is too 
complex to determine the estimated profits when some projects have not yet been realised 
before the end of the fiscal period. This can have implications on the bank’s dividends 
payouts. Also, unlike their conventional counterparts, Islamic banks cannot employ all the 
capital available to undertake investment opportunities, either because the regulations do 
not allow them, or because the capital available for investment is higher than the Islamic 
banks’ investment portfolio (Ahmed 1996). However, such related complexities and issues 
are not raised in a conventional banking business model as Islamic rulings will not con-
strain its distributable profits. Depositors in this bank type obtain their returns in the form 
of regular/composite interest payments, which are treated as expenses when conventional 
banks compute their net profits and dividends for shareholders. As such, an important 
difference between Islamic and conventional banks in this respect is the shift in treating 
returns payable to depositors as a distribution of shared profits and not an expense (Alhab-
shi 2002; Saeed and Izzeldin 2016). In contrast to Islamic banks, the interest expenses 
paid for depositors in conventional banks should be independent of the completion of 
investment projects. These banks, hence, may have lower difficulties in calculating prof-
its distributable for shareholders. Accordingly, the Islamic banking financial structure of a 
dividend-based model differs from conventional banks (Schaik 2001; Safiullah and Sham-
suddin 2019), which may lead to different payout levels between two bank types.
Third, with the restrictions imposed on the Islamic banking dividends model, which 
must comply with the Shari’ah principles, profit distributions by Islamic banks reflect 
an active process involving a nexus of contracts between the bank, depositors and equity 
holders (Schaik 2001; Alhabshi 2002; Safiullah and Shamsuddin 2019; Abdelsalam et al. 
5 Permissible earnings and profits must be calculated from the volume of money which participated in the 
bank trading activities and investments within the specific pre-determined contractual timeframe for exam-
ple when the capital was initially deposited (Ahmed 1996). Provisions, depreciation expensed, or other 
expenses related to the investment of depositors should be actual and not estimated, to arrive at the actual 
profits of depositors.
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2020). Thereby, the profit and dividend payout decisions of Islamic banks are associ-
ated with an agreement among these three parties. In other words, the basis and manner 
of profit distributions could change subject to the contract agreement among parties. This 
adds to the main structural differences in the distribution motives of Islamic banks relative 
to their conventional counterparts. The payouts decisions by Islamic banks’ managers are 
ultimately driven by the preferences of both investors and depositors.6 In contrast, a sound 
distribution policy in conventional banks depends solely and mainly on the preference of 
investors (shareholders) to enhance the bank market value (Al-Hunnayan and Hashem 
2011). Therefore, compared to conventional banks, additional monitoring costs imposed on 
Islamic banks might be needed to avoid investors/depositors’ disappointment.7
Finally, the mechanics and techniques of Islamic bank dividend distributions are likely 
to be more complicated than those of conventional banks (Athari et al. 2016). A survey by 
Al-Hunnayan and Hashem (2011) defines a commonly used dividend model in an Islamic 
bank and summarises its key structures based on four steps; (i) revenues and expenses allo-
cation; (ii) reserves and provisions deductions; (iii) distributions for profit and loss saving 
and investment accounts (PSIA); and (iv) distribute dividends (see “Appendix A”). At each 
step of this payout process, there are potential variations in the practices of Islamic banks. 
Moreover, under the PLS paradigm, the dividend decisions by Islamic banks managers are 
subject to the interactions between PSIA and dividend distributions. In contrast, conven-
tional banks are known as intermediates between depositors and borrowers, and their reve-
nue is defined as the difference in the interest gains between the two parties. Thus, their net 
profit is calculated by the deduction of expenses from revenues (Saeed and Izzeldin 2016). 
Payout decisions in conventional banks, nevertheless, are related to current bank profit-
ability, future growth opportunities and optimal capital budget as well as equity amount 
needed to finance the optimal budget via retained earnings (e.g., Deshmukh et  al. 2013; 
Onali et al. 2016).
3  Hypothesis development
Irrespective of the bank type (i.e. conventional or Islamic), the agency conflicts of divi-
dend payouts represent an ultimate cost occurring when managers and shareholders disa-
gree about the distributable profits. However, Islamic banks encounter additional agency 
costs because of indirect monitoring by investment account holders who cannot intervene 
in the banks’ financial and business decisions. This offers opportunities for bank managers 
to engage in discretionary acts (see Elnahass et al. 2014; Elnahass et al. 2018), possibly 
including controlling and managing dividends payouts. Moreover, conflicts among IAHs, 
managers and shareholders may arise from the overlap and interactions between differ-
ent components of the dividends model discussed above. Managers in Islamic banks have 
6 While the bank should ensure that the depositors contracted under PLS contracts are sufficiently rewarded 
(Wilson 2007), there are several key challenges which will affect a profit distribution policy within Islamic 
banks. These are (i) the profit-sharing ratio; (ii) the concentration of asset risks; (iii) the amount of reserves 
maintained; and (iv) weights assigned to the various classes of investment deposits to calculate regulatory 
capitals; and (v) the distributions of earnings to non-investment deposits as well as to priority deposits in 
financing and investment (FAS 5, AAOIFI 1997; FAS 6, AAOIFI 1997).
7 When the rate of return of Islamic banks is at a disadvantage, shareholders may have to scarify their prof-
its to minimise withdrawal risk from depositors. Furthermore, the choice of an appropriate profit distribu-
tion principle in Islamic banks can affect the depositors’ perceptions of the fair return distribution.
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more opportunities to amend the reserves and provisions, profit distribution rates on PSIA 
and the dividends, which could lead to severe agency conflicts. Such a wide latitude of 
discretion further adds to the complex structure of the dividend model employed by this 
banking sector.
The BOD’s characteristics and attributes are likely to affect the dividend strategies for 
both bank types. However, the monitoring needs in Islamic banks by BOD are likely to be 
higher than conventional banks due to their complex governance structure and strict trad-
ing process (Safieddine 2009). Under the constrained Islamic banking model, BOD has 
additional responsibilities related to the establishment of the appropriate Shari’ah govern-
ance framework besides the development of relevant policies to ensure that all activities are 
conducted in compliance with the Shari’ah law.
Therefore, the extent and effectiveness of systems of governance within the two bank-
ing sectors are expected to have implications on their dividend payouts. Unlike conven-
tional banks, there is a scarcity of outside directors who have expertise and knowledge in 
Shari’ah legitimacy to support the complex payout structure within Islamic banks. Hence, 
busy BOD in Islamic banks are expected to be less capable of providing the necessary 
level of oversight and monitoring functions. This is because a busy board might have less 
involvement (i.e. time, attention and efforts) to thoroughly review the long-term strategies 
and investment opportunities, which must be compliant with the Islamic principles, and 
make indicative decisions for dividend distributions. Hence, the pitfall related to less effec-
tive monitoring can lead to lower dividend levels as managers can pursue their interests 
at the expense of shareholders. According to the busyness hypothesis (e.g., Sharma 2011; 
Cashman et  al. 2012), busy outside directors are less likely to effectively monitor man-
agers’ risk-taking and expropriation behaviours for banks as they overstretch themselves 
across too many companies and spend less time on each board. Moreover, busy boards 
may not have sufficient reputational benefits to contribute to their institutions (Trinh et al. 
2020a). As such, an increase in their workload is closely associated with a decline in divi-
dend payouts (Sharma 2011). Thereby, an inverse association between busy BOD and divi-
dend payout in Islamic banks is predicted.
Unlike Islamic banks, conventional banks operating on a single layer of governance and 
a more flexible/stable dividend model tend to encounter relatively lower agency costs. For 
this specific banking business model, busy boards have several opportunities to promote 
additional reputational benefits for their banks (e.g., provides advising services on payouts 
policy, brings flexible and alternative funding sources) to the conventional banks’ dividend 
models by enhancing board internal monitoring and mitigating the agency problems of a 
firms’ liquid assets, managerial opportunism and uncertainties (e.g., Chou and Feng. 2019). 
However, these benefits are less likely to be obtained by Islamic banks because their busi-
ness model is marked with greater complexity. Therefore, board busyness in conventional 
banks is predicted to be more beneficial from a reputational and expertise perspectives 
when compared to their Islamic counterparts (Elnahass et  al. 2020a). Such reputational 
benefits are likely to influence the dividends business model of conventional banking, lead-
ing to possibly higher payouts levels.
Based on the identified differences for the dividends models among the two bank types, 
we conjecture that board busyness has adverse impact(s) on dividends payouts within 
Islamic banks unlike conventional banks. Having a busy board is anticipated to cause pro-
nounced negative consequences on the payouts levels in Islamic banks relative to conven-
tional banks. This forms our hypothesis stated in an alternative form, as below:
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H1 Islamic banks with a busy board of directors pay lower levels of dividends than con-
ventional banks.
4  Data and sources
Dividend and other consolidated financial data (in thousand U.S. dollars) are collected 
from DataStream, Bankscope and Bloomberg. Governance-level data is obtained from 
annual reports, which reflect board members’ profile for both listed Islamic and conven-
tional banks, including the number of directorships of outside directors, the number of 
directors and independent directors on boards, among others.8 Macroeconomics and coun-
try governance indicators used in our tests are obtained from the World Bank database. We 
started the data collection process with the list of Islamic banks trading on global stock 
markets. Consistent with prior Islamic-conventional banking literature (e.g., Beck et  al. 
2013; Mollah et al. 2017; Elnahass et al. 2020a, b; Trinh et al. 2020a, b), four criteria are 
applied to filter our sampled banks which are: (a) banks located in countries which have 
both bank types, and at least two listed banks; (b) banks with annual reports published 
in their official website and of the financial year of 31 December; (c) banks are classi-
fied as commercial full-ledged; and (d) banks have at least three consecutive years of data 
availability. The availability of corporate governance, dividend and financial data for banks 
located in countries with dual banking systems have reduced the study’s sample size to 70 
listed banks operating in 11 countries.9 These countries are classified as emerging econo-
mies where dividend payouts policies are different in either nature or characteristics from 
those adopted in developed markets. These differences are mainly associated with chal-
lenges in raising equity fund, the effect of controlling shareholders who prefer re-investing 
into future projects than distributing dividends, the extent of investor protection, the quality 
of market infrastructure and legal uncertainties (see Baker et al. 2011; Jabbouri 2016).
The final sample represents 27 Islamic (295 firm-year observations) and 43 conventional 
banks (447 firm-year observations) during the period from 2006 to 2018. We are chal-
lenged by the availability of high-quality of data for Islamic banks, which are very limited 
before 2006. Hence, we identified year 2006 as our cut off beginning year for data collec-
tion. We also emphasise that Islamic banks have been subject to several regulatory changes 
before 2006 including the mandatorily adoption of Basel II capital adequacy requirements 
as of the end of 2006 (see Elnahass et al. 2018). Therefore, our study’s sample period offers 
simultaneous and comparative examinations across both Islamic and conventional banks 
while recognising the effect of during the financial crisis of 2007–2009.
Table 2, reports the sample distribution by country and bank. The percentage of bank 
representations is 39.8% for Islamic banks and 60.2% for conventional banks. Both Bah-
rain and Bangladesh have the highest concentration of Islamic banks, while Indonesia and 
Bangladesh represent the highest concentration of conventional banks.
8 Directorships related to activities in sports clubs, non-for-profit, trusts and charitable organisation are 
excluded (see Field et al. 2013; Chakravarty and Rutherford 2017; Trinh et al. 2020a).
9 These countries are Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Ara-
bia, UAE and Oman.
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5  Methodology and measures
5.1  Bank dividend policy and board busyness
We follow prior literature to measure our dependent variable; cash dividends over total net 
income (DIV/NI) (e.g. Jiraporn et  al. 2011; Chen et  al. 2017). This proxy represents the 
proportion of cash dividends paid to the shareholders over the earnings reported in a given 
period. We treat DIV/NI as a censored variable since it cannot be below zero (Jiraporn et al. 
2011). Following previous literature (Onali et al. 2016; Jiang et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2017), 
we further use alternative measures of dividend strategies, comprising of the propensity to 
pay dividend (LIKE_PAY), dividends over total assets (DIV/Assets), dividends over sales 
(DIV/Sales) and dividends per share (DIV/Share), in our sensitivity tests.
Our main variable of interest is busy BODs. A busy outside director is defined as an 
individual who serves in at least two outside firms (Ferris et al. 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 
2006; Elyasiani and Zhang 2015). We focus on outside directors since those directors’ pri-
mary duty is to monitor the management board while inside directors serve in the BOD for 
several other purposes (Cashman et al. 2012). Based on this, we measure a busy BOD as 
the ratio of outside directorships per outside director (i.e. ABOD), representing the average 
number of other outside board seats held by each outside director. It is computed as the 
total number of additional (outside) boards occupied by outside directors divided by the 
number of outside directors on the board (Ferris et al. 2003; Chou and Feng 2019).
5.2  Model specifications
To the extent that dividends are expected to mitigate agency costs of managerial expropria-
tion and overinvestment (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986) and under the predictions of rela-
tively higher agency conflicts arisen from the payout process in Islamic banks compared to 
their conventional counterparts, we conjecture that conventional banks with busy BOD are 
more likely to pay higher dividends to shareholders than Islamic banks. In our estimations, 
we test the possible relation between busy BOD (ABOD) and dividend payout ratio (i.e. 
DIV/NI). However, since managers pay dividends to shareholders in ways that align inter-
ests between shareholders, managers and directors, board busyness and payouts decisions 
are likely to be determined endogenously. For example, busy outside directors can choose 
to work for banks with high dividend payout (e.g. Sharma 2011). Also, banks could simul-
taneously select busy outside directors and dividend policies to address agency problems 
of free cash flow. Therefore, we performed the Three-Stage Least-Square (3SLS) estima-
tions and Instrumental Variables (IVs) to minimise such possible presence of endogeneity 
(see Elyasiani and Zhang 2015; Onali et al. 2016; Trinh et al. 2020a).10
This estimation requires the identification of suitable IVs. Following previous studies 
(e.g. Elyasiani and Zhang 2015; Trinh et  al. 2020a; Trinh et  al., fcos2020b), we use the 
number of public firms headquartered in the country as our first IV. It is argued that out-
side directors of the banks having headquarters located in nations with more public firms 
can easily find additional jobs. Therefore, we predict that the higher the number of public 
10 Relevant IVs are defined as those related to the suspected endogenous variable and uncorrected with the 
error terms of the dependent variable. The Sargan test and Breusch and Pagan LM test indicate that both 
IVs selected in this study are valid.
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firms headquartered in the same country, the more the number of busy outside directors. 
We also include the country-level income-generating category as a second IV.11 This is 
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if “home” bank is headquartered in a middle and 
high-income generating country and otherwise, taking the value of 0 if such bank is in 
a low-income generating country. We contend that outside directors of banks located in 
high-income generating nations will have more opportunities to find high-skill jobs in 
other institutions, and hence, they are more likely to have multiple directorships (World 
Bank 2016; Trinh et al. 2020a). Both IVs might be correlated with possible endogenous 
variables (board busyness) and should predict bank dividend policy only indirectly through 
their impacts on endogenous variables (Black et al. 2006). Within our study’s setting and 
sampled banks, those IVs can indirectly influence bank dividend payout patterns since the 
country-level variables are less likely to affect individual firms’ payout strategies endoge-
nously. Under 3SLS estimations, we treat both ABOD and DIV/NI as endogenous variables 
and establish the simultaneous equations as follows12:
where DIV∕NIi,t represents the cash dividends over net income. We estimate the dividend 




 . ϕP is a vector of control variables in the dividend 
regression model that accounts for the effect of firm-level and country-level characteristics 
on the dividend payout; Year effects capture the year-fixed effects. εit is the error term.
Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Jiraporn et  al. 2011; Sharma 2011; Mulyani et  al. 
2016; Chen et al. 2017), we control for other board characteristics, firm-specific and coun-
try-specific characteristics to mitigate potential omitted variables bias and capture other 
factors affecting the bank dividend payouts. Managerial entrenchment is likely to affect 
dividend policy (Hu and Kumar 2004), and dividend payout is considered as a collective 
decision of the board (Saeed and Sameer 2017). Therefore, we control for a set of board-
related variables to capture the quality of bank governance structure such as board size 
(LogBSIZE) and board independence (%INDEP). The former is measured by the number 
of directors on the board while the percentage of outside non-executive directors meas-
ures the latter (Hu and Kumar 2004; Chen et al. 2017). We additionally control for other 
firm-specific characteristics, which may affect corporate dividend payouts. This includes 
firm size measured by the total assets in the logarithm form (LnTA) which may positively 
related to a payout (Mulyani et al. 2016; Saeed and Sameer 2017). We also control for bank 
financial leverage (LEV) measured as the ratio of total liabilities (long-term and short-term) 
to total equity. This measure affects dividend payouts due to its role in reducing agency 
problems and due to debt covenants on dividends imposed by debtholders (Sharma 2011). 
Higher LEV reflects lower values for capitalisation; thus, it signals weaker corporate finan-
cial health and is expected to be linked to lower dividend payouts (Abreu and Gulamhus-
sen 2013; Saeed and Sameer 2017). We capture growth opportunities (CAPEX/ASSETS) 
through the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets We control for the availability 
(1)DIV∕NIi,t = 0 + 1ABODi,t + P + Year effects + i,t
(2)ABODi,t = 0 + 1DIV∕NIi,t + P + Year effects + i,t
11 Countries having high Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (> $1045) are classified as middle and 
high income, otherwise low-income (World Bank, 2015).
12 We performed the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test across all our models to examine whether endogeneity 
exists or not. The test statistics suggest the presence of endogeneity bias.
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of cash/cash reserves through the ratio of cash and marketable securities divided to net 
assets (total assets minus cash and marketable securities), CASH/ASSETS (Jiraporn et al. 
2011). According to DeAngelo et al. (2006), retain earnings are essential determinants of 
dividend payouts. Therefore, we control for the ratio of retained earnings to total equity 
(RETAIN/EQUITY). We also control for profitability performance measured by the ratio 
of net income to total assets (ROA) which is expected to positively affect dividend pay-
outs (Sharma 2011; Mulyani et al. 2016; Saeed and Sameer 2017). We also control for the 
possible impact of banking sector concentration (i.e. activity diversification) on dividend 
policy by using Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) (Mollah et al. 2017).
Moreover, we use the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product per capita (GDP-
CAPITA) to capture the economic development of the region/country (Trinh et al. 2020b). 
Finally, we control for the difference in the national quality of governance across coun-
tries by including determinants of regulatory quality (REGULATORY) (Bitar et al. 2017). 
This indicator measures the quality of governance performance that reflects perceptions 
of the ability of the government to formulate and conduct good policies and regulations to 
promote the private sector. It is estimated by ranging from − 2.5 (weak) to + 2.5 (strong) 
(World Bank 2016). “Appendix B” provides definitions of all variables used in our models.
5.3  Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample and both, Islamic banks (IBs) 
and conventional banks (CBs) sub-samples. We find that CBs (0.334) have a higher mean 
ratio of payouts relative to IBs (0.313), which is confirmed by the paired mean compari-
sons t test which is significant. The results provide some primary indications supporting 
our expectations that IBs are likely to report lower dividend payouts relative to CBs. For 
board busyness, CBs show a higher board busyness (ABOD) than IBs; with higher means 
of 2.389 (1.995) for CBs (IBs) respectively. The two bank types show significant differ-
ences for the mean t test.13
For other governance control variables, CBs have a significantly lower mean (2.109) for 
the BOD size (LogBSIZE) than IBs (2.293). The board independence (%INDEP) mean is 
higher in CBs (36.6%) as compared to IBs s (32.3%). Furthermore, consistent with prior 
literature (e.g. Beck et al. 2013, Abedifar et al. 2013), CBs are larger and more profitable 
than IBs. They also tend to hold less cash (CASH/ASSETS) and retain higher income rela-
tive to their total equity (RETAIN/EQUITY) than IBs. These results are supported by the 
paired mean t-test across the two bank types.
Table 4 presents the Pearson Pair-Wise correlation matrix among all tested variables for 
the IBs (lower diagonal) and CBs subsample (higher diagonal). CBs report significant pos-
itive correlations between ABOD and DIV/NI while there is a negative correlation between 
ABOD and DIV/NI in IBs. These results suggest that an increase in BOD busyness is asso-
ciated with higher levels of dividends in CBs, which is an opposite case for IBs. The cor-
relations between DIV/NI and others are generally in line with prior literature. All correla-
tions among explanatory variables are considerably lower than the 0.80 thresholds, which 
13 The unreported two-sample t-tests for CBs with busy BOD and IBs with busy BOD show that the mean 
of dividend payout level (DIV/NI) in CBs with busy BOD (0.356) is significantly higher (0.051) than that in 
IBs with busy BOD (0.304).
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Table 5  3SLS estimates of dividend payout ratio and busy boards of directors—within Islamic and conven-
tional Banks
The table shows Three-stage Least-Square (3SLS) results for the full sample (Panel A), Islamic bank sub-
sample (Panel B) and Conventional bank subsample (Panel C) identifying the effect of busy board of direc-
tors on a bank’s dividend payout ratio. We treat both busy boards of directors and the firm payout ratio as 
endogenous variables and build simultaneous equations models as follows
DIV∕NIi,t = 0 + 1ABODi,t + P + Year effects + i,t (3)
ABODi,t = 0 + 1DIV∕NIi,t + P + Year effects + i,t (4)
where DIV∕NIi,t represents the cash dividends over net income. The diagnostic tests show that LM Sta-
tistics P-value is lower than 1% and Sargan test P-value is higher than 10% across all models, suggesting 
that the chosen IVs for busy boards are valid and all models are not over-identified. P-values are shown in 
parentheses, *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. See “Appendix B” for all variable definitions.
Variables Panel A: full sample (IBs and 
CBs together)





ABOD 0.062*** − 0.800*** 0.085***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
LogBSIZE 0.025 0.613 − 0.077
(0.647) (0.113) (0.170)
%INDEP − 0.162** − 2.897*** − 0.174**
(0.045) (0.001) (0.031)
LogTA 0.073*** 0.043** 0.091***
(0.000) (0.049) (0.000)
LEV 0.009* − 0.020*** 0.012*
(0.073) (0.006) (0.059)
ROA 0.017*** 0.017** 0.057***
(0.002) (0.030) (0.000)
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.001 0.006 0.003
(0.799) (0.321) (0.404)
CASH/ASSETS − 0.049 − 1.252* 0.298
(0.850) (0.072) (0.191)
RETAIN/EQUITY − 0.019*** − 0.036*** − 0.021***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
HHI 0.296* 0.176 0.181
(0.080) (0.674) (0.449)
GDPCAPITA 0.031 − 0.383* − 0.026
(0.297) (0.093) (0.381)




Constant − 1.342*** − 1.841*** − 0.976***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Year fixed effect YES YES YES
Observations 742 295 447
R-Square 0.084 0.112 0.059
χ2 196*** 215*** 249***
LM Statistics (P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan test (P-value) 0.207 0.109 0.670
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suggest that multicollinearity is not dominant and it is mitigated in our model (Gujarati 
2003).14
6  Empirical results
6.1  The level of cash dividend payouts within Islamic and conventional banks
The regression results examining the effect of BOD busyness on dividend payouts are pre-
sented in Table 5 for Panel A (full sample), Panel B (IBs sub-sample) and Panel C (CBs 
sub-sample). We control for year fixed-effects in all models.15
In Panel A, we find that the coefficient on the board busyness indicator (ABOD) is posi-
tively associated with the dividend payout ratio (DIV/NI) for the full sample. The coef-
ficient on busy BOD is also economically significant; an increase by 1% in BOD busyness, 
on average, is leads to an increase in the dividend payout ratio of banks by 0.062%. This 
result suggests that banks with busy BOD are likely to support a higher cash dividend pay-
out policy. Such finding is also in line with the resource dependence theory indicating that 
outside directors working in multiple companies can promote stronger governance mecha-
nism and bring valuable resources (i.e. expertise, skills, experience, and access to external 
resources) to their firms. The reputational benefits associated with busy BOD appear to 
reduce the conflicts between managers and shareholders related to the usage of free cash 
flows (see Sharma 2011) and hence, mitigate the probability that managers misuse avail-
able cash. This, in turn, leads to a high dividend ratio. With respect to control variables, 
results are in line with expectations and prior studies (Jiraporn et  al. 2011; Chen et  al. 
2017; Chou and Feng 2019) indicating that dividends are employed to disgorge free cash 
flow to investors in the absence of other devices. In fact, LogTA and ROA have significantly 
positive impacts on the payouts ratio. Larger and more profitable firms exhibit however, 
in contrast, board independence (%INDEP) and retain earnings (RETAIN/EQUITY) have 
negative and significant effects on the dividend ratio. Although the negative coefficient 
on   %INDEP does not support our predictions, they are consistent with Hu and Kumar 
(2004) which find that board independence is only positively linked to payout if it exceeds 
40%. Finally, we obtain significant results for country indicators, with a positive coefficient 
of GDP growth and a negative coefficient of regulatory quality.
When examining the effect of the bank type on the expected association between board 
busyness and dividend payout, in Table  5 panels B and C, we find that IBs with busy 
BOD exhibit lower cash dividend payout ratios, with a significantly negative coefficient 
on ABOD. In contrast, CBs having busy BOD tend to pay out significantly high levels of 
cash dividends to their shareholders, supported by positive coefficients on the test variable 
ABOD. These results indicate that the reputational benefits of busy BOD for banks divi-
dend payout strategies tend to be more pronounced in CBs rather than IBs. In term of eco-
nomic significance, for CBs, the coefficient of busy BODs is economically significant, as 
a 1% increase in board busyness reflects 0.8% increase in the bank dividend payout ratio. 
14 Unreported Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analyses for our tests indicate that all individual VIFs values 
of our variables are well below 10, the mean of all VIF values is less than 6 and the condition index is less 
than 15.
15 In unreported sensitivities, we control for both year and country fixed effects across all models tested. 
Our main findings remain unchanged.
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Meanwhile, a 1% increase in board busyness reduces dividend payout ratio by only 0.085% 
within IBs.16 For the control variables, we find that the board independence (%INDEP) it is 
negatively associated with DIV/NI. For both bank types, we find that the effects of LogTA 
and ROA on DIV/NI are significantly positive. Notably, we find opposing results for LEV 
between IBs and CBs. We find that higher leverage is negatively associated with dividend 
payouts within IBs. This is consistent with our predictions developed for the IB business 
model, which is marked by free-interest payments and profit-loss sharing, as well as prior 
literature; suggesting that both debt and high dividend payout are ways to reduce free cash 
flow problem (Benito and Young 2003; Chen et al. 2017). Indeed, LEV affects dividend 
payouts due to its role in reducing agency problems and due to debt covenants on dividends 
imposed by debtholders (Sharma 2011). Higher LEV reflects lower values for capitalisa-
tion; thus, it signals weaker corporate financial health and is expected to be linked to lower 
dividend payouts (Abreu and Gulamhussen 2013; Saeed and Sameer 2017). Although such 
an association is found to be positive for CBs and full sample, it is still in line with prior 
studies in conventional literature (e.g., Jiraporn et al. 2011; Chou and Feng 2019) show-
ing a positive relation between leverage and payouts. This can be explained that financial 
leverage can increase shareholders’ return on investment and usually have tax advantages. 
Therefore, when LEV increases, this may result in an increase in return and in turn posi-
tively affects dividend policy. Moreover, according to Jiraporn et al. (2011) and Cooper and 
Lambertides (2018), dividend-paying firms are more leveraged than non-dividend paying 
firms. This is consistent with management increasing the dividend to use up excess debt 
capacity that may be particularly true for CBs which can easier access to debt market than 
IBs. The coefficients for RETAIN/EQUITY in both bank types are significant and negative, 
which is in line with those reported in Panel A.17
Taken together, the findings provide strong evidence that board busyness positively 
affect dividend cash payouts on average. Having a busy board tend to have differential 
impacts on the dividend payouts across the two bank types. Busy board increases the levels 
of cash dividends for CBs relative to IBs. Such positive impact of board busyness within 
CBs suggests that busy boards seem to offer preferential access to funds and other net-
working benefits to support higher payouts. The finding is consistent with the reputation 
view of busy boards (Trinh et al. 2020a). The negative effect of busy boards on dividend 
payouts within IBs can be justified by their constrained dividend model which is less flex-
ible and more restrictive. Managers in IBs have more opportunities for discretion and 
control over the payout process. Hence, having busy board lead to a detrimental impact 
on cash dividends payouts. Such result support earlier arguments regarding the negative 
consequences for board busyness (e.g. Sharma 2011; Elyasiani and Zhang 2015), indicat-
ing ineffective monitoring ability by busy boards to review a complex dividend model like 
IBs. In addition, the results showing the distinct impacts of BOD busyness on the Islamic 
17 Following Elnahass et al. (2018), we further introduce an indicator variable: The Auditing Organization 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) to control for financial reporting regulatory differences across 
IBs in our sample, which apply either AAOIFI or IFRS standards. This variable takes a value of one if an 
IB is located in Bahrain, Jordan, or Qatar and applies AAOIFI, and zero for an IB in another country and 
applies IFRS. Results remain relatively unchanged. Tables will be provided upon request.
16 In unreported sensitivities, we captured cross-country variations in governance perceptions for our sam-
ple. We followed Čihák and Hesse (2010) to develop a country governance index (COUNTRY_GOV) as an 
additional control variable. This variable is estimated as the average of six key country-governance meas-
ures developed by the World bank which are: corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, and 
regulatory quality, the rule of law, and voice and accountability. We relatively obtained similar results.
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versus conventional banking business models further support arguments by Elnahass et al. 
(2020a) and Trinh et al. (2020a) showing that busy BODs are likely to exacerbate agency 
conflicts in IBs, leading to lower bank stability and poorer market valuations relative to 
conventional banks. There overall findings are in line our expectations and support the 
study’s main hypothesis.18
6.2  Additional analyses and robustness checks
This section presents several sensitivity and robustness tests for our main results. We aim 
to examine whether or not our main findings hold when using: (i) alternative measures for 
dividend policy; and (ii) alternative model specifications/estimation procedures. We further 
test for the possible non-linear relationships between busy boards and bank dividend pay-
out among the two dividend models.
6.2.1  The likelihood of dividends payouts
In line with our main predictions, we further examine whether CBs having a busy BOD are 
more likely to pay cash dividends when compared to IBs. Because the dependent variable 
is a dummy variable, we use a Logit function where the probability of LIKE_PAY vari-
able is estimated using the functional form π(x) = e.g.(x)/(1 + e.g.(x)). This function represents 
the propensity to pay cash dividend (e.g. Sharma 2011; Chen et al. 2017). Our likelihood 
model is specified as follows:
where LIKE_PAYi,t takes the value of 1 if the bank pays cash dividends in year t and other-
wise 0. Robust standard errors are employed to account for potential correlation in errors.19
Analyses for both bank types in Table 6 (Panels B and C) indicate that IBs with busy 
boards are less likely to pay dividends, with a significant and negative coefficient on LIKE_
PAY. In contrast, CBs having busy boards are positively associated with a high likelihood 
of a payout. Busy BODs are likely to recommend the payment of a cash dividend in CBs. 
These results imply that the reputational benefits of a busy BOD for payout decisions might 
be more pronounced in CBs relative to IBs, which further explains our main findings in 
Table 5 and offer additional support. Overall, findings confirm the existence of differential 
impacts of BOD busyness on the propensity to pay dividends across two banking models.
(3)LIKE_PAYi,t = f
{
0 + 1ABODi,t + P + Year effects + i,t
}
18 For unreported sensitivities, we find consistent results when adding three additional variables into the 
main models (Table 5) including qualifications of outside directors (%INDQ) calculated as the percentage 
of outside directors holding doctoral degrees to the total outside directors (Shari’ah advisors), the audit 
committee size (LogACSIZE) measured by the natural logarithm of the number of these board members, 
and audit committee effectiveness (%BAC), which is the proportion of busy directors on the audit com-
mittee (Trinh et  al. 2020a). The inclusion of these variables reduces the number of observations for IBs 
subsample due to their missing data. Hence, we do not report this, yet tables will be provided upon request.
19 The high Nagelkerke pseudo R2 for the full sample (IBs, CBs) is 62% (66%, 71%) and the model X2 is 
significant at 1%, suggest that models are appropriate, and the chosen variables are good estimators for 
bank propensity to pay dividends.
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6.2.2  Alternative measures for dividend payout ratios
In this section, we re-estimate our baseline models in Eqs. 1 and 2 but we use other alter-
native measures for dividend payout ratios. These include: (i) dividends over total assets 
(DIV/Assets); (ii) dividends over sales (DIV/Sales); and (iii) dividends per share (DIV/
Share).20 Those measures are widely employed in literature such as Jiraporn et al. (2011), 
Chen et al. (2017), and Saeed and Sameer (2017). In Table 7, we find consistently across 
all regressions that coefficients on ABOD within IBs are significantly negative while those 
in CBs are significantly positive. These results are in line with our main findings and con-
firm that the main findings are not sensitive to alternative indicators for dividends payouts.
6.2.3  Alternative measures for board busyness
To check if the measures of board busyness affect our main results, we extended our analyses 
to use two other alternative proxies for board busyness: (i) the percentage of busy outside 
directors serving on the board (%BBOD) estimated by the number of busy outside direc-
tors serving on two or more additional (outside) firms divided by the total number of outside 
directors on the board; and (ii) the dummy board busyness variable (DUMMY_BOD) taking 
the value of one if at least 50% of outside directors on board are busy and zero otherwise. All 
of these measures are widely utilised in previous board busyness studies (e.g., Ferris et al. 
2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Chou and Feng 2019; Trinh et al. 2020b). We report the 
results in Table 8, which show consistent findings to the main analyses which are presented in 
Table 5. We, therefore, conclude that ABOD is a robust measure for board busyness.
6.2.4  Test for a non‑linear relationship
We examine whether there is a possible non-linear association between busy BOD and div-
idend payouts in banks, under the two opposing views of having a busy board (i.e. reputa-
tion versus busyness view). We follow Trinh et al. (2020a) and Trinh et al. (2020b), which 
suggest a simple linear link may not fully describe the relation between busy BOD and firm 
outcomes. For instance, at lower degrees of busyness (i.e. the number of outside director-
ships), the reputational impact is likely to outweigh the cost of busyness impact because 
the reputational effect may increase greater than the proportional rise in BOD busyness. 
Nonetheless, when board busyness increases, this effect tends to grow less than proportion-
ately with a rise in BOD busyness, resulting in the dominance of the busyness view.
We, therefore, add the square of busy BOD, i.e. (ABOD2), into our baseline models to 
check if such non-linear association exists for both bank types. The simultaneous equations 
models are specified in Eqs. 4 and 5 as below:




+ P + Yeareffects + it




+ P + Yeareffects + it
20 In unreported descriptive statistics, the means (medians) of DIV/Assets, DIV/Sales and DIV/Share for 
full sample are 0.249 (0.006), 0.077 (0.047) and 3.43 (0.02), respectively. In addition, the means of DIV/
Assets, DIV/Sales and DIV/Share of IBs (CBs) are 0.196 (0.284), 0.083 (0.074) and 0.87 (5.117), respec-
tively. These results generally show that CBs have a higher dividend payout ratios than IBs, which are also 
supported by the significant of the two-sample mean t test.
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Table 6  Sensitivity test: logit estimates of the Likelihood of dividend payouts and busy boards of directors
The table shows Logit regression results for the full sample (Panel A), Islamic bank subsample (Panel B) 
and Conventional bank subsample (Panel C) which identifies the impact of busy BOD on a bank’s propen-
sity to pay dividends. We build the Logit model as below
LIKE_PAYi,t = f
{
0 + 1ABODi,t + P + Year effects + i,t
}
  (6)
where LIKE_PAYi,t takes the value of 1 if the bank paid cash dividend in year t and otherwise 0; ϕP is a 
vector of control variables in the dividend regression model that account for the effect of firm- and country-
level factors on a bank’s propensity to pay. Models are tested for the period 2010–2015. P-values are shown 
in parentheses, *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. See “Appendix B” for all variable definitions.
Variables Panel A: Full sample (IBs and 
CBs together)






ABOD 0.063** − 0.156** 0.102**
(0.021) (0.019) (0.017)
LogBSIZE 0.313 1.175* 0.177
(0.307) (0.075) (0.687)
%INDEP − 0.015 0.281 − 0.679
(0.978) (0.725) (0.405)
LogTA 1.098*** 1.304*** 1.255***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEV 0.106*** 0.030 0.313***
(0.002) (0.738) (0.000)
ROA 0.662*** 0.057 2.131***
(0.000) (0.618) (0.000)
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.043 − 0.045 0.060
(0.182) (0.311) (0.287)
CASH/ASSETS 0.116 − 6.563** 6.925*
(0.947) (0.014) (0.066)
RETAIN/EQUITY − 0.162*** − 0.009* − 0.378***
(0.000) (0.066) (0.000)
HHI − 0.626 2.571 − 0.858
(0.580) (0.156) (0.745)
GDPCAPITA − 0.392** − 0.792** − 0.329
(0.035) (0.013) (0.239)




Constant − 13.827*** − 13.552*** − 19.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 742 295 447
Pseudo R2 0.302 0.333 0.419
Wald  X2 283*** 90*** 232***
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Table 7  Sensitivity tests: alternative measures of dividend payout ratios
The table shows the main 3SLS results for the Islamic bank subsample (Panel A) and Conventional bank 
subsample (Panel B) using alternative measures for bank’s dividend payout ratios (i.e. dividends over total 
assets, dividends over sales, dividend per share). P-values are shown in parentheses, *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, 
***P < 0.01. See “Appendix B” for all variable definitions
Variables Panel A: ISLAMIC Banks (IBs) Panel B: Conventional banks (CBs)















YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank-level group YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-level group YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 295 295 295 447 447 447
R-Square 0.372 0.212 0.023 0.433 0.128 0.110
χ2 LM (P-value) 183*** 303*** 72*** 553*** 472*** 165***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan (P-value) 0.127 0.168 0.131 0.869 0.119 0.110
Table 8  Sensitivity tests: alternative measures of board busyness
The table shows the main 3SLS results for the Islamic bank subsample (Panel A) and Conventional bank 
subsample (Panel B) using alternative measures for BOD busyness (i.e. %BBOD, DUMMY_BOD). P-val-
ues are shown in parentheses, *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. See “Appendix B” for all variable defini-
tions
Variables Panel  A: ISLAMIC Banks (IBs) Panel B: Conventional 
banks (CBs)
DIV/NI DIV/NI DIV/NI DIV/NI
%BBOD − 1.571*** 0.391***
(0.000) (0.003)
DUMMY_BOD − 1.314*** 0.286***
(0.000) (0.001)
Corporate governance group YES YES YES YES
Bank-level group YES YES YES YES
Country-level group YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 295 295 447 447
R-Square 0.062 0.154 0.100 0.150
χ2 LM Statistics (P-value) 97*** 96*** 218*** 216***
0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000
Sargan test (P-value) 0.346 0.527 0.407 0.546
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Table  9 provides the 3SLS results for the non-linear check, with Panel B (for IBs) and 
Panel C(CBs). We find that for CBs, there is an opposite direction on the coefficient of 
ABOD2 relative to its original form (ABOD), which suggests a non-linear relationship 
between busy BOD and bank dividend level. More specifically, we find that within CBs, 
the reputation effects tend to diminish proportionally as the outside board directorships 
increase. That is, the reputation effect of busy BOD in CBs only outweigh the cost of 
busyness effects at the lower degree of outside directorships. However, for IBs, we find an 
insignificant and positive sign on the coefficient of the square term of busyness; ABOD2. 
This result implies a simple linear relation between busy BOD and bank dividends policy. 
Such additional analyses provide evidence supporting the detrimental role of having a busy 
director on board when the bank’s business model is unique and marked by a constrained 
dividend model. The results also support our main findings for the adverse effects of busy 
boards on the payout ratio of IBs.
Table 9  Possible non-linear 
relationship between boards 
busyness and bank dividend 
payout level—within Islamic and 
Conventional Banks
The table reports 3SLS results for possible non-linear associations 
between busy boards of directors and bank dividend payout level for 
the IB subsample (Panel A) and CB subsample (Panel B). We build 
simultaneous equations models




+ P + Yeareffects + it 
(9)




+ P + Yeareffects + it 
(10)
where ϕP is a vector of control variables in the bank dividend payout 
level model including bank-level indicators and country-level indica-
tors. The diagnostic tests show that LM Statistics P-value is less than 
1% and Sargan test P-value is greater than 10% across all models, 
indicating that the chosen IVs for board of directors’ busyness are 
valid and the models are not over-identified. P-values in parentheses, 
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. See “Appendix B” for other vari-
able definitions.








ABOD − 0.448** 0.404***
(0.025) (0.008)
(ABOD)2 0.044 − 0.046***
(0.131) (0.008)
Corporate governance group YES YES
Bank-level group YES YES
Country-level group YES YES
Constant − 0.013 − 1.455***
(0.983) (0.000)
Year fixed effect YES YES
Observations 295 447
Adjusted R-Square 0.170 0.376
χ2 LM Statistics (P-value) 112*** 181***
0.000 0.000
Sargan test (P-value) 0.159 0.337
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6.2.5  The effect of the financial crisis
In this analysis, we examine if the relationship between board busyness and dividend 
policy changes will still holds under the macro-economic shock of the financial crisis of 
2007–2009. This global crisis may prevent banks from distributing dividends or paying 
lower levels to retain cash to support distressful periods of low liquidity and bank survival. 
We introduce to our baseline model in Eqs. 1 and 2, an interaction term (ABOD*Crisis) 
between the time dummy variable of financial crisis (Crisis) and our main board busy-
ness variable (ABOD). The simultaneous equations models are specified in Eqs. 6 and 7 as 
below:
Table 10  The effect of financial crisis on the relationship between boards busyness and bank dividend pay-
out level - Within Islamic and Conventional Banks
The table reports 3SLS results for the effect of financial crisis on the associations between busy boards of 
directors and bank dividend payout level for the IB subsample (Panel A) and CB subsample (Panel B). We 
build simultaneous equations models:
DIV∕NIit = 0 + 1ABODit + +2CRISIS + 3ABOD*CRISIS + P + Yeareffects + it (4)
ABODit = 0 + 1DIV∕NIit + +2CRISIS + 3ABOD*CRISIS + P + Yeareffects + it (5)
where ϕP is a vector of control variables in the bank dividend payout level model including bank-level 
indicators and country-level indicators. The diagnostic tests show that LM Statistics P-value is less than 
1% and Sargan test P-value is greater than 10% across all models, indicating that the chosen IVs for board 
of directors’ busyness are valid and the models are not over-identified. P-values in parentheses, *P < 0.10, 
**P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. See “Appendix B” for other variable definitions.









ABOD × CRISIS 0.148 − 0.071***
(0.105) (0.000)
Corporate governance group YES YES
Bank-level group YES YES
Country-level group YES YES
Constant − 0.254 − 1.272***
(0.830) (0.000)
Year fixed effect YES YES
Observations 295 447
R-Square 0.260 0.120
χ2 LM Statistics (P-value) 101*** 257***
0.000 0.000
Sargan test (P-value) 0.862 0.797
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where Crisis represents a dummy variable taking the value of one if the observed year is 
2007, 2008 or 2009, and zero otherwise) (see Abedifar et al. 2013). Table 10 reports the 
results for IBs (Panel A) and CBs (Panel B). We find consistent results for the coefficient 
on ABOD for IBs and CBs. We find no significant evidence for board busyness on IBs dur-
ing non-crisis years. However, during the non-crisis periods, board busyness is positively 
associated with cash dividends payouts in CBs. Within the crisis period, the observed posi-
tive association within CBs is mitigated; the effect of a busy board on dividends payouts is 
lower. Within IBs, there is an insignificant association between the interaction term and the 
dividend payout ratio (DIV/NI), showing insignificant association. These findings imply 
that CBs reduce their dividends payouts (i.e. holding more cash) during periods of finan-
cial distress to meet expected losses and possibly meet regulatory capital requirements, 
which is in line with life cycle theory showing that firms may behave differently according 
to their existing stage (Fama and French 2001). Both the Crisis variable and the interaction 
term show insignificant results within IBs. This further confirms previous arguments in lit-
erature (e.g., Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al. 2013) which suggest that the Islamic banking 
business model is more stable during episodes of financial distress. Unlike conventional 
banking system, which promotes pro-cyclicality in lending, the Islamic banking business 
model is counter cyclical in line with its interest-free nature (Elnahass et al. 2018). This 
business model represents risk sharing rather than risk shifting, which is more dominant in 
conventional banking.
6.2.6  Robustness check: Controlling for firm fixed effects
Following the study of Bhagat and Bolton (2019), we control for firm fixed effects. We find 
that our main findings in Table 11 are relatively unchanged compared to those reported 
for the main analyses in Table 5 where we do not apply firm fixed effects but we use only 
year fixed effects. This test shows that our results are consistent and robust under different 
model specifications.
6.2.7  Robustness check: two‑step system generalized models of moments (GMM)
To address potential endogeneity problems in estimated models, we investigate the robust-
ness of our main findings by employing GMM technique (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blun-
dell and Bond 1998). This approach captures for unobserved influences by transforming 
the variables into first difference to mitigate the effects of either unobserved heterogeneity 
or omitted variable bias. By using the GMM, we can treat all corporate governance and 
bank-level indicators as endogenous, and their IVs are lagged values (Hermalin and Weis-
bach 2003; Mollah and Zaman 2015; Mollah et al. 2017; Trinh et al. 2020a, b, c). Other 
country-level variables, including macroeconomics and country governance, are treated 
as strictly exogenous. GMM has an advantage of solving the endogeneity problem upon 
on “internal instruments” rather than “external instruments” or natural experiments and 
accounting for the dynamic nature of panel data by including bank dividend payouts as one 
of the regressors (see Meng et al. 2018).
(6)
DIV∕NIit = 0 + 1ABODi,t + 2Crisisi,t + 3ABODi,t ∗ Crisisi,t + P + Yeareffects + it
(7)
ABODit = 0 + 1DIV∕NIi,t + 2Crisisi,t + 3ABODi,t ∗ Crisisi,t + P + Yeareffects + it
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In Table 12, findings are consistent with our main results. Busy BOD in CBs tends to 
be positively associated with the dividend payout ratio (DIV/NI) while IBs show significant 
negative impacts of board busyness on their dividends payouts. These results indicate that 
main findings remain unchanged even after using controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity.
For a separate, unreported, sensitivity we check if our findings are sensitive to the selec-
tion of IVs under the 3SLS estimations. We use an alternative IV for our baseline mod-
els in Eqs. 1 and 2, which is the yearly average of the busy boards of other firms in the 
same country for our sample. This approach of instrumenting was adopted by Trinh et al. 
(2020a) and Safiullah and Shamsuddin (2019). A change in dividend payout level of one 
bank is less likely to affect the busy boards of other banks. Therefore, this IV is expected 
to be associated with board busyness but unlikely to correlate with error terms in the main 
equation. Our reported findings remain unchanged to the main findings.
6.2.8  Propensity score matching (PSM) method
We argue a possibility that busy BODs maybe not randomly distributed across banks 
within our sample. Also, some variables which are related to the appointments of those 
outside directors could be associated with banks’ risk levels, which may affect the divi-
dend payouts levels. To solve the problem, we utilise a propensity-score matching tech-
nique21 to identify a control group of banks (whose BODs are not consisted of at least 
fifty per cent busy outside board members, but exhibit no observable differences in charac-
teristics relative to banks with busy BODs) and the treatment group (banks whose BODs 
are consisted of at least fifty per cent busy outside board members). Therefore, the main 
purpose of matching banks from control and treatment groups is to ensure that each pair 
of matched banks is virtually indistinguishable from one another except for the function of 
BOD busyness.
We followed Chakravarty and Rutherford (2017) and Casu et  al. (2013) to construct 
matches and computing the propensity score equal to the probability that a bank with a 
given function has a BOD that is consisted of at least fifty per cent busy outside board 
members. Indeed, we estimate propensity score as a function of LogBSIZE,   %INDEP, 
LEV, return on assets (ROA), LogTA and GDPCAPITA. This propensity score test aims 
to balance all the covariates between the two groups (Trinh et al. 2020b). The control vari-
ables included in this model should not be affected by the treatment; therefore, we lagged 
them by one year, which is consistent with Casu et al. (2013). Subsequently, we proceed to 
match with replacement each bank with a busy BOD (treatment group) with banks having 
non-busy BOD (control group) using the nearest neighbour technique.
Results in Table 13 (Panel B) show that CBs with a busy board have higher payouts 
ratio even after holding observable bank characteristics virtually constant between control 
and treatment groups. Differences between these two groups are statistically significant. In 
contrast, we find an opposite finding in the subsample of IBs (Panel A). Our results imply 
that the self-selection bias does not significantly afflict our analyses. Taken together, our 
main results appear to be robust across different model specifications.22
21 This propensity score matching method is applied for the entire sample period and for both sub-samples 
of IBs and CBs.
22 We have made sensitivity tests by dropping Indonesian banks and checked the results. We find the same 
results to the sample including all banks and countries. Therefore, the issues related to Indonesia might not 
influence our results.
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7  Conclusion
This study offers a novel perspective regarding the effectiveness of an essential internal 
governance mechanism which is the BOD in association with firm dividend payout strate-
gies. We offer new insights to the wide set of literature, covering both financial and non-
financial firms, through exploring the impacts of having a busy board member on cash 
dividend payouts. The study comparatively assesses the use of alternative dividend models 
by different bank types (i.e. Islamic versus conventional banks). Our results show that for 
the full sample, a greater representation of busy members on the board has a positive and 
significant influence on the dividend payout ratio. The results provide support for resource 
dependence theory, which argues the reputational benefits are likely to emerge for banks 
with busy outside directors. When extending the analyses to identify the effect of different 
bank types, we find that the dividend level and likelihood of payouts are higher in conven-
tional banks with busy BODs when compared to Islamic banks. We explain these findings 
structural differences between the dividends model employed across the two bank types, 
where for example, the Islamic dividend model is marked by more complexity and less 
flexibility for payout dividends under stricter Islamic principles associated with the non-
interest return payments, the mechanics of profit distributions and the required effective 
Shari’ah governance.
Our extended analyses examined the effect of the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and we 
find that during the crisis period, the impact of board busyness on dividends payouts is 
significantly lower within conventional banks but we observed insignificant effect within 
Islamic banks. Furthermore, we find a non-linear relationship between board busyness and 
dividend level within conventional banks. Specifically, the reputation effects tend to dimin-
ish proportionally as the outside board directorships increase. However, we find only a 
Table 11  Controlling for firm 
fixed effects
The table reports the sensitivity results for the main tests in Table 5 
using firm fixed effects








ABOD − 0.966** * 0.392**
(0.001) (0.035)
Corporate governance group YES YES
Bank-level group YES YES
Country-level group YES YES
Constant − 0.631 − 1.776*
(0.176) (0.072)
Year fixed effect YES YES
Bank fixed effect YES YES
Observations 295 447
Adjusted R-Square 0.246 0.273
χ2 LM Statistics (P-value) 213*** 1202***
0.000 0.000
Sargan test (P-value) 0.159 0.170
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Table 12  Robustness Check: 
GMM estimates of dividend 
payout ratio and busy boards of 
directors
The table shows the results of a robustness check employing GMM 
method within Islamic banks subsamples (Panel A) and conventional 
banks subsamples (Panel B) to investigate the effects of busy boards 
of directors on bank dividend payout ratio (i.e. dividend over net 
income). P-values are shown in parentheses, *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, 
***P < 0.01. See “Appendix B” for all variable definitions





ABOD − 0.088*** 0.017***
(0.009) (0.003)
LogBSIZE 0.439 − 0.180*
(0.185) (0.088)








CAPEX/ASSETS − 0.004** 0.010***
(0.046) (0.003)
CASH/ASSETS − 0.857** 0.270
(0.050) (0.329)








Lagged Dividend/NI − 0.072*** − 0.001*
(0.000) (0.073)
Constant − 2.499** − 1.071***
(0.019) (0.007)
Year fixed effect YES YES
Observations 268 404
Number of Banks 27 43
F-test (P-value) 0.000 0.000
AR (1) 0.074 0.048
AR (2) 0.176 0.124
Hansen P-value 0.149 0.338
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simple linear relation between busy boards and bank dividends policy within Islamic bank-
ing sample.
Overall, the findings imply that unlike conventional banks, the dividend policy of 
Islamic banks is likely to be more sensitive to the busyness level of outside directors serv-
ing on the board. The results indicating the positive impact of busy boards on dividend 
payouts within conventional banks suggest that busy outside directors tend to offer sev-
eral preferential benefits to their banks which support high levels and high likelihood of 
dividend payouts. These results reinforce those of Chou and Feng (2019) showing that 
increasing the number of outside directorships of independent directors can enhance the 
board internal monitoring function. The results reported in this study highlight the need for 
policymakers who govern dual banking systems to consider board multiple directorships 
quotas particularly for Islamic banks. Investors and depositors dealing with different bank 
types and those located in emerging economies could benefit from our research to under-
stand the underlying nature/structure of the dividend models employed within alternative 
banking sectors. For global banking systems, it might be the time for regulators and other 
stakeholders to address how institutional factors and additional governance requirements 
(e.g. Shari’ah governance) might have implications on optimal finance choices and distri-
butions of profits, as presented in the case of Islamic banks. Future research, therefore, may 
extend our study to consider other board characteristics, such as financial expertise, educa-
tion and tenure, and their impacts on long-term financial policies.
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Table 13  Propensity-score marching estimators—board of directors busyness and Bank dividend payouts
The table reports the propensity score matching estimates of the average treatment effects (ATE) of board 
busyness on bank dividend policy of busy board of directors for Islamic banks (Panel A) and Conventional 
banks (Panel B) subsamples. *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. See “Appendix B” for all variable defini-
tions





Panel A: Islamic banks
 Treated: DIV/NI (busy boards) 0.319 − 0.030** − 2.49 (0.049)
 Controls: DIV/NI (non-busy boards) 0.350
Panel B: Conventional banks
 Treated: DIV/NI (busy boards) 0.364 0.045** 2.66 (0.043)
 Controls: DIV/NI (non-busy boards) 0.319
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permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly 
from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/.
Appendix A: Four‑step dividend payout process in Islamic banks
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Appendix B: Variable definitions
Variables Abbreviations Definitions
Dividends over net income DIV/NI Cash dividends over net income
# Average directorships of outside direc-
tors
ABOD Average outside directorships per inde-
pendent director, calculated as total num-
ber of additional (outside) boards held by 
independent directors divided by number 
of independent directors on the board
Board of Directors Size LogBSIZE Natural logarithm of the total number of 
board of directors’ members
Board Independence %INDEP Percentage of independent non-executive 
directors on the board of directors
Bank Size LogTA Natural logarithm of total assets of a bank 
at the end of the year
Leverage LEV Bank leverage which is measured by total 
liability divided by total equity
Profitability ROA The ratio of net income to total assets
Capital expenditure over total assets CAPEX/ASSETS The ratio of capital expenditures to assets, 
represented for bank growth opportuni-
ties
Cash over net assets CASH/ASSETS The ratio of cash to net assets. Net assets 
are calculated as total assets minus cash 
and marketable securities
Retain Earnings RETAIN/EQUITY The ratio of retain earnings to total equity
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index HHI The measure of bank concentration. Higher 
value of HHI indicates greater bank 
concentration. HHI, which takes value 
from 0 to 1, is computed by the square 
of the sum of the ratio of total assets of 
each firm-year to total assets of all firms 
each year
GDP per capita GDPCAPITA Annual Gross Domestic Products (GDP) 
per capita in the natural logarithm form
Regulatory quality REGULATORY Measuring the quality of governance 
performance that reflects perceptions of 
the ability of government to formulate and 
conduct good polices and regulations to 
promote private sector. It is estimated by 
ranging from − 2.5 (weak) to + 2.5 (strong)
Likelihood of a dividend payout LIKE_PAY Dummy variable, taking value of 1 if bank 
pays a dividend and 0 otherwise
Dividends over total assets DIV/Assets Dividends over total assets
Dividends over sales DIV/Sales Dividends over total sales
Dividends per share DIV/Share Dividends per share
Average country governance index COUNTRY_GOV This alternative proxy for country govern-
ance effects is estimated as the average 
of six key country-governance measures: 
corruption, government effectiveness, 
political stability, and regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and voice and accountability
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Appendix C: distribution of the propensity score of treated 
and non‑treated before and after matching
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